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NOTE
Hoover Company v. Commissioner: A
Judicial One Way Street
[Tihe definition of a capital asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions
interpreted broadly
Recently, the tax court in Hoover Company v. Commissioner,' re-
fused to apply the Corn Products doctrine3 and found that a corpora-
l Corn Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
2 72 T.C. 206 (1979).
3 Responding to the amorphous and incomplete statutory definition of "capital assets" in
§ 117(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1939, the Supreme Court, in Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), enunciated the doctrine that enlarged the exceptions to the
capital assets definition. See Note, Judicial Treatment of "Capital" Assets Acquiredfor Business
The New Criterion, 65 YALE L.J. 401, 407 (1955-56), [hereinafter cited as YALE Note]. In the Note,
the author argued that Corn Products evinced the Supreme Court's reaction toward "piecemeal
. . . exclusionary clauses" in § 117 of the Code. See also Drachsler, Alien Law in Federal Taxa-
tion." Characterization ofAlien Juristic Concepts, 33 TUL. L. REv. 751 (1959). Drachsler noted that
Corn Products resulted from Congress' persistent failure to define "capital assets" under § 117.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 117(a), (now I.R.C. § 1221) provided:
(1) CAPITAL ASSETS-The term 'capital assets' means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of
the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of
the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or property,
used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation
provided in section 23(l);
The modern definition of capital assets is found in I.R.C. § 1221:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the tax-
payer (whether 6r not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(I) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly
be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or
property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or
business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum,
or similar property, held by-
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tion's forward sales agreements in foreign currencies were not hedging
agreements.4 The court concluded that such sales did not constitute an
integral part of the business,5 and thus losses from such transactions fell
outside the protection of Corn Products and were afforded capital treat-
ment.6
This note will suggest that the Hoover court, in focusing its deci-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for whom
such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for pur-
poses of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part by reference to the
basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business
for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1);
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia, issued on or after March 1,
1941, on a discount basis and payable without interest at a fixed maturity date not exceed-
ing one year from the date of issue; or
(6) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congressional
Record) which is received from the United States Government or any agency thereof, other
than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to the public, and which is held
by-
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is determined, for
purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part by reference to
the basis of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A).
In Corn Products, the Court held that hedging transactions in corn futures, although not
explicitly mentioned in the statutory exclusions, warranted ordinary tax treatment because the
transactions were not speculative or capital investments. The Court reasoned that the transactions
provided a form of insurance against increases in the price of the company's raw materials and
were thus, an integral part of the taxpayer's business. This line of analysis is widely known as the
"integral part of business" test. 72 T.C. at 233. It is the presence of investment or speculative
intent that prevents application of the Corn Products integral part of business doctrine. Con-
versely, hedging or protective transactions without such investment intent triggers the Corn Prod-
ucts doctrine. See YALE Note at 406. In the Note, the author stated that "Corn Products
represents a significant change in the judicial application of section 1221. The decision in effect
rewrites section 1221, excluding from the definition of 'capital assets' all property held, without
investment intent, in connection with the taxpayer's business." (footnote omitted), Id For a dis-
cussion of the Corn Products doctrine, see Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains andLosses-The Corn
Products Doctrine, 52 TAXEs 770 (1974); Note, The Impact of Corn Products: Twenty-Three Years
Later, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 869 (1978).
it is important to note that Corn Products has not been limited to hedging transactions-
instead, courts have given it broad application. See Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United
States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971); Chemplast, Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 623 (1973); Steadman v.
Comm'r, 424 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1970); Comment, The Corn Products Doctrine andIts Application to
Partnershop Interests, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 341 (1979).
4 72 T.C. at 240.
5 Id at 237.
6 In its defintion of a "capital asset" in section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress
explained the term negatively. That is, first the legislators broadly premised that property held by
a taxpayer is a capital asset; then, they listed a catalogue of exceptions to their definition.
For corporate tax purposes, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets are given capital
loss treatment and such losses are allowed only to the extent that they offset capital gains. I.R.C.
§ 1211(a). Whereas, non-capital asset losses and business expenses are deductible in full. I.R.C.
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sion on the form of the taxpayer's transaction (i.e., whether it was a
"bona fide" hedge), failed to properly apply the "integral part of busi-
ness" doctrine. To buttress this thesis, the note will first compare Hoo-
ver to Corn Products. Then, the analysis will juxtapose Hoover with
the Corn Products' progeny, Wool Distributing Corp. v. Commissioner7
and International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. Commissioner -two
cases involving international currency hedges. Finally, the note will
discuss the impact Hoover might have on a proliferating foreign cur-
rency futures market.9
THE HOOVER COMPANY
In Hoover, the taxpayer, a publicly held Delaware corporation
with subsidiaries in foreign countries, was engaged in the business of
manufacturing and distributing vacuum cleaners and sundry small ap-
pliances. 10 Hoover held over half of the outstanding shares of a British
corporation, Hoover Ltd., which possesses wholly owned subsidiaries
in seven countries."
On November 18, 1967, the pound fell 14% in value, dropping
§§ 165, 162. In contrast, gains from sales or exchanges of capital assets are given capital gain
treatment and usually receive less taxation than ordinary gains. I.R.C. §§ 1201(a), 11.
Whether a corporation's property is deemed a "capital asset" is an imperative issue for the
corporate taxpayer. If the property is subject to capital tax treatment, (i.e., if the property is a
"capital asset" under § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code), significant losses on the sale or ex-
change of the property might be forever lost. Conversely, if these losses are taxed at ordinary
rates, valuable tax deductions could result. Given today's corporations, including the large multi-
national, tremendous sums can be at issue. Oftentimes when Congress creates critical statutory
concepts, vigorous legal debate follows and the courts must slowly delineate these terms. Through
such judicial analyses, the term "capital asset" has evolved. See E. GRISWOLD, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 657-58 (6th ed. 1976).
7 34 T.C. 323 (1960).
8 62 T.C. 232 (1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit did not reverse
the tax court's analysis and application of the Corn Products doctrine to a foreign currency futures
transaction in International Flavors. Instead, the court remanded the case to the tax court to de-
cide whether International Flavors' sale of its future contract to a third party was a "sale" of
property under section 1222(3) and subject to long term capital gain treatment. 524 F.2d at 360.
Recognizing that its analysis of Corn Products was not reversed by the Second Circuit in Interna-
tional Flavors, the court in Hoover found it necessary to discuss its initial position in International
Flavors. 72 T.C. at 236.
9 See notes 81-84 infra and accompanying text.
10 72 T.C. at 208.
11 The wholly owned subsidiaries were located in Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Nor-
way, Sweden and South Africa. The taxpayer also owned an aggregate interest in Hoover N.V., a
Dutch corporation that owned subsidiaries in Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy and
Switzerland. In addition, Hoover had wholly owned subsidiaries in Canada and Panama. The
Panamanian corporation in turn owned subsidiaries in Panama, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico.
The taxpayer sold its products primarily in the United States, Canada and the Caribbean,
whereas, Hoover Ltd. supplied the subsidiaries in Europe and South Africa. Id
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from $2.80 to $2.40.12 Because of the devaluation, the translation pro-
duced an exchange loss of $3,650,318 that the taxpayer recorded in its
consolidated financial statement. 13 Hoover reported this exchange loss
as an extraordinary charge against its consolidated earnings.1 4 As a
result of subtracting the extraordinary charge from its consolidated
earnings, Hoover's earnings per share of common stock dropped from
$2.09 to $1.54.15 While the currency devaluation unfavorably affected
Hoover's net earnings for financial purposes, it did not result in a rec-
ognized federal tax loss. 6
Responding to the adverse impact of exchange losses on both its
foreign stock investment and its financial image,' 7 Hoover, in the years
1968 through 1970, engaged in eighteen forward sales contracts in an
effort to protect itself against potential currency devaluations occurring
in its subsidiaries' countries.' 8 Unlike an earlier forward sales agree-
ment 19 which only protected the taxpayer against the danger of devalu-
ation within an expected dividend payment, these later transactions
were made to offset Hoover's net exposure in the foreign subsidiaries.
By estimating the net assets in a subsidiary exposed to risk and then by
multiplying the fraction which represented Hoover's ownership interest
in the subsidiary, the taxpayer calculated its "net exposure.""z Hoover
never intentionally "hedged" an amount exceeding its interest in the
net value of the foreign subsidiary.2'
12 Id at 215.
13 Id
14 Id at 216.
15 Id
16 Id,
17 Hoover contended that the extraordinary charge had an adverse impact on its economic
reputation with potential and existing investors. Hoover argued that its reputation was damaged
because it could not accurately predict consolidated earnings amidst an uncertain foreign ex-
change market. Most importantly, Hoover contended that the value of its stock investment was
reduced in subsidiaries who were affected by their country's currency devaluation. Lastly, the
taxpayer feared that these devaluations might affect the value of future dividend income from
these subsidiaries. Id
18 Id at 218.
19 Early in 1967, the taxpayer was worried about a potential devaluation in the British pound
since Hoover expected an interim dividend from Hoover Ltd. that was payable in British pounds
on September 6, 1967. Id at 214. In order to remove the risk of a devaluation of foreign cur-
rency, Hoover entered into a forward sale agreement on March 16, 1967, with Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. whereby the latter agreed to purchase £300,000 from Hoover for delivery on
September 6, 1967. Id at 214-15. The taxpayer instructed Hoover Ltd. to make the dividend
payment directly to the bank. Although no devaluation occurred prior to the September 6th divi-
dend payment, Hoover was still concerned with a potential devaluation in the pound. Id at 215.
20 Id at 216-18.
21 Id at 225.
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A typical forward sale contract 22 by Hoover resulted in two trans-
actions with the same bank. First, the taxpayer would sell currency for
delivery on a certain date, and then, immediately before delivery was
due, it would enter into another contract to purchase the same amount
of currency at the new price. No currency physically changed hands-
the bank simply debited or credited Hoover's account. In all but two of
these eighteen transactions, the taxpayer had a loss. 23 Hoover treated
all of these transactions as ordinary gains or losses for federal income
tax purposes. The tax court, however, held that the transactions mer-
ited capital tax treatment.
THE HoovER COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE
CORN PRODUCTS ANALYSIS
In its discussion of the appropriate tax treatment afforded hedging
transactions, the tax court, in Hoover, cited24 Treasury ruling G.C.M.
17322. In the ruling,25 the Commissioner held that future transactions,
if speculative in nature, deserve capital tax treatment; whereas, future
transactions "which eliminate speculative risks due to fluctuations in
the market price of [a commodity]. . .[and which] tend to assure ordi-
nary operating profits, are common trade practices and are generally
regarded as a form of insurance" and thus are entitled to ordinary tax
treatment.26 In an effort to distinguish its case from the ruling, the
Hoover court interpreted the ruling narrowly and concluded that "it
was readily apparent that a hedge in commodity futures represented an
effort to offset actual purchases and sales of the commodity with an
equivalent amount on a future sale or purchase contract respec-
22 "Commodity futures markets provide insurance opportunities to merchants and processors
against the risk of price fluctuation .... A trader is termed a hedger if his commitments in the
cash market are offset by opposite commitments in the futures market. An example would be that
of a grain elevator who buys wheat in the country and at the same time sells a futures contract for
the same quantity of wheat. When his wheat is delivered later to the terminal market or to the
processor in a normal market, he buys back his futures contract. Any change of price that oc-
curred during the interval should have been cancelled out by mutually compensatory movements
in his cash and futures holdings. The hedger thus hopes to protect himself against loss resulting
from price changes by transferring the risk to a speculator who relies upon his skill in forecasting
price movements." 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 816-17 (15th ed. 1974). See also P. SAMUEL-
SON, ECONoMIcs 424-25 (10th ed. 1976).
23 72 T.C. at 219-20.
24 Id at 229.
25 G.C.M. 17322, XV-2 C.B. 151-52 (1936). The taxpayer, a textile manufacturer, entered into
cotton futures transactions in an attempt to protect himself against the fluctuation in the market
price of cotton. The transactions resulted in a net loss but were afforded ordinary tax treatment.
Id
26 72 T.C. at 229.
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tively."' 27 In other words, according to the tax court, the Treasury rul-
ing was an example of what the Hoover court defined as the
archetypical bona fide hedge-the only hedge that warrants ordinary
tax treatment.
In Corn Products, the Supreme Court interpreted the same ruling
far less narrowly. The Court felt that the Treasury ruling, according to
Corn Products, merely distinguished "speculative transactions in com-
modity futures from hedging transactions"; 28 the latter were a form of
protection similar to business insurance. 29 Hence, while the tax court
interpreted the ruling as an illumination of bona fide hedges, the
Supreme Court focused on the distinction between speculation and
protection. Indeed, if the Supreme Court had, like Hoover, employed
the narrow distinction between bona fide hedges and those that de-
served capital treatment, the facts in Corn Products would have de-
manded a contrary holding.30
In his dissent in Hoover, Judge Chabot criticized the majority's
narrow interpretation of the Corn Products doctrine. Quoting Corn
Products, he noted that Congress intended that profits and losses aris-
ing from the everyday operation of a business be treated as ordinary
income or loss, and the same congressional purpose required that the
definition of a capital asset be narrowly applied and its exclusions in-
terpreted broadly.3 Comparing Hoover to the sharply dissimilar hold-
27 Id The tax court in Hoover acknowledged one exception to this bona fide hedge analysis.
According to Hoover, Corn Products demonstrated that non bona fide hedges could merit ordinary
tax treatment only if they were integral to the taxpayer's business. Id at 234. The tax court
concluded that Hoover's transactions did not come under this exception since the corporation's
futures were not protecting the business operation, but were protecting the corporation's invest-
ment in its foreign subsidiaries. Id at 237. Significantly, however, when the Supreme Court
developed the integral part of business doctrine in Corn Products, it never focused on the particu-
lar business items which the taxpayer attempted to protect. Instead, the Court examined the intent
of the taxpayer and then it applied ordinary tax treatment to protective transactions, and capital
tax treatment to speculative transactions. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra.
28 350 U.S. at 5.
29 Id at 50.
30 In Corn Products, the taxpayer manufactured products from corn. Concerned about an
increase in corn prices and its inability to store more than a short supply, the taxpayer established
a long position in corn futures as the most economical way to insure an adequate supply of corn
without suffering the costs of additional storage facilities. Each fall when the corn prices were
most favorable, it purchased futures in corn and took delivery on the contracts to meet its supply
needs. If no shortages appeared, the corporation sold the excess futures the following summer. In
this manner, the taxpayer "reached a balanced position with reference to any increase in spot corn
prices.. . [but] made no effort to protect itself against a decline in prices." Id at 49. The futures
resulted in a net gain for the taxpayer. Although the transactions did-not constitute "true hedg-
ing" agreements (i.e., under its sales policy, the taxpayer could not guard against a fall in corn
prices), the Court held that the gains should be taxed at ordinary rates. Id at 53-54.
31 72 T.C. at 252-53 (quoting Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 51-52).
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ing in International Flavors,32 he warned, "I am concerned that we not
embark on the evolution of a court-made 'one way street.' "3 In addi-
tion, he argued that unlike the single transaction in International
Flavors, those in Hoover recurred, and therefore, conformed with the
principles promulgated by the Supreme Court in Corn Products.3 4 Fi-
nally, he concluded that Hoover's transactions were created for the pur-
pose of protecting aspects of the taxpayer's trade or business and not as
investments to provide revenue.35 This remark illuminates the protec-
tion and speculation dichotomy found in Corn Products and its prog-
eny.36
Unlike Hoover, Corn Products did not decide the tax treatment
issue by citing37 doubtful precedent 38 like Commissioner v. Farmers and
32 62 T.C. 232 (1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1975), see note 8 supra for further discussion
of case history. See also notes 69-80 and accompanying text infra.
33 72 T.C. at 252.
34 See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
35 72 T.C. at 253.
36 The Sixth Circuit summarized the distinction between protective and speculative futures in
United States v. Rogers, 286 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1961). In Rogers, the taxpayer, a livestock breeder,
traded egg futures and the court held that losses from such transactions were capital. Id at 282.
The court refused to apply the Corn Products doctrine because there was no relationship between
the taxpayer's business and the commodity futures in which he dealt. In other words, livestock
prices had no connection with egg futures. The court noted that hedges, in contrast to speculative
trading, secure protection with some degree of certainty because the prices of the commodity
future fluctuate closely with the product or property in the business. Id Hoover is distinguishable
from Rogers because the taxpayer's business in Hoover, a multinational corporation, was certainly
affected by foreign currency devaluations. As the result of such a currency devaluation, Hoover
suffered financial report exchange losses that translated into lower net earnings from its foreign
subsidiaries. 72 T.C. at 215-16. Thus in Hoover, currency futures were employed as an effective
protective mechanism to insure against an adverse market impact upon the taxpayer's business.
The distinction between speculation and protection is also illustrated in Grote v. Commis-
sioner, 41 B.T.A. 247 (1940). In Grote, the court held that the taxpayer, a wheat producer who
sold wheat futures to protect against grain market price fluctuations, was entitled to ordinary loss
treatment on such transactions. Id at 249. The court reversed the Commissioner's ruling because
he "thought that petitioners' transactions were merely speculations in future contracts having no
relation to their production business." Id Like the taxpayer in Grote, Hoover did not enter into
its future contracts with a speculative purpose, but instead, employed them to protect the corpora-
tion from adverse market fluctuations.
A similar distinction is apparent in Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (1971). In
Dearborn, the Court of Claims ruled that the taxpayer, a furniture seller, who purchased stock in
a wood raw materials supplier and then suffered a loss on such transaction, deserved capital loss
treatment. Id at 1168. In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the petitioner had three
substantial investment-speculation purposes for buying the stock. Nonetheless, in obiter dictum,
the court concluded that losses from corporate stock purchases made as "an integral and necessary
act in the conduct of the business. .. [and made] without investment intent" were ordinary. Id
at 1166.
37 72 T.C. at 230-31.
38 See Annot., Transactions in comodityfutures as giving riseforfederal income tax purposes, to
capitalgains and losses, 100 L.Ed. 36 (1955). The author noted that "the holding [in Corn Prod-
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Ginners Cotton Oil Co. 39 and Trenton Oil Co. v. Commissioner.40 In
these cases, ordinary treatment resulted only when the transaction fit
within their narrowly prescribed definition of a "true" hedge. Instead
of employing this narrow definition, the Court in Corn Products went
directly to the Internal Revenue Code's capital asset provision and ex-
posed 4 the legislative purpose for creating capital tax treatment. Ac-
cording to the Court, capital tax treatment was merely intended as a
tool to relieve the taxpayer from undue tax burdens when converting
capital investments, and thus, capital asset definitions were construed
narrowly.42 In developing the "integral part of business" rule in Corn
Products, the Court focused upon the taxpayer's intent in entering the
transaction. Once the Court found a protective intent and not a specu-
lative one, it concluded that such intent was contrary to the activity of a
"legitimate capitalist," 43 and thus, the activity was an integral part of
business and exempt from capital treatment.44
Under the Corn Products analysis, the transactions in Hoover
merit ordinary tax treatment. Like the taxpayer in Corn Products,
Hoover routinely conducted its transactions in the course of business
over a period of years. The taxpayer did not have a speculative pur-
pose, but simply attempted to protect its business from adverse market
fluctuations. 41 Instead of following the Supreme Court's twofold anal-
ysis of taxpayer intent and Congressional purpose, the tax court looked
at the form of the transaction. 6 In arguing that the crucial issue in
Hoover was whether the taxpayer's futures were bona fide hedges,47 the
ucts] would appear to have thrown some doubt upon the continued authoritative weight of certain
earlier decisions of lower federal courts" like Farmers & Ginners and Trenton. Id at 39. Likewise
illustrating the cases as worn precedent, the author of the YALE Note stated that "[u]ntil Corn
Products, however, courts [like Farmers & Ginners and Trenton] tended to define a 'true' hedge
narrowly, holding that losses from transactions in commodity futures by a business taxpayer
which were not 'true' hedges were deductible only as capital losses." YALE Note at 404, n.17.
39 120 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1941).
40 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945).
41 Corn Products reflects the first time that the Supreme Court has unequivocally noted that
the legislative definition of capital assets encompasses simply investments. See YALE Note at 406.
42 The Court expressly found that "Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the
everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain
or loss." 350 U.S. at 52.
43 Id at 51.
44 Id at 53.
45 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
46 This approach also conflicts with 3B MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX. In his
analysis of Corn Products, Professor Mertens noted that the "point of this decision appears to be
that the courts are to look not merely to the subject matter of a transaction but also to its purpose
in the context of the taxpayer's course of business." Id at 100.
47 72 T.C. at 229.
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tax court ignored Corn Products and the legislative policy articulated
by the Supreme Court.
Wool Distributing Corp- The Protection-Speculation Analysis
Hoover is also inconsistent with tax court opinions which discuss
the Corn Products doctrine as it applies to an international setting. In
Wool Distributing Corp. v. Commissioner,48 the tax court held that a
wool dealer's losses from future transactions in foreign currencies,
made in order to protect his holdings in foreign wools, were entitled to
ordinary loss treatment.49 Instead of enunciating a precise rule which
clearly defined future transactions which deserve ordinary tax treat-
ment, the court generally concluded that the taxpayer entered into such
transactions "with the bona fide intent of providing a particular form of
price insurance" against a "temporary threat posed by the reasonably
anticipated possibility of currency devaluation." 50 The futures were
thus sufficiently within the nature of hedging operations as to be ex-
empt from capital asset tax treatment.-" While generally distinguishing
these protective transactions from purely speculative transactions, the
court likened the former to a type of insurance and reasoned that such
are so closely connected with the regular conduct of business as to repel
classification as extraneous investments. 2
Like the entrepreneur in Wool, the taxpayer in Hoover was con-
cerned with foreign currency devaluations and their potentially adverse
consequences upon its business. Analogous to the investment of for-
eign goods in Wool, the investment in Hoover involved the corpora-
tion's interest in its subsidiaries abroad. A devaluation of foreign
currency in either instance would likely have effected an immediate
reduction in the value of the investment. Thus, the taxpayers in both
cases were employing futures as critical protective measures. Indeed,
the court in Hoover admitted that Hoover's futures were designed to
offset a potential decline in the value of its ownership interest in its
foreign subsidiary.53 Furthermore, once the taxpayers in both cases es-
timated their exposed interest at risk in the foreign country, neither
held currency futures that exceeded such risk.54 This last factor was
48 34 T.C. 323 (1960).
49 Id at 332.
5 0 1d
51 Id
52 Id at 330.
53 72 T.C. at 226.
54 The court, in Wool, noted that "[alt no time did. . . [taxpayer's] holdings of currency
futures exceed its inventory of those wools." 34 T.C. at 332. Similarly, the taxpayer in Hoover
Hoover Company v. Commissioner
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crucial in the Wool decision. In distinguishing investment from protec-
tion, the court noted that a larger amount of futures than actual owner-
ship interests (i.e., actuals), or an absence of price relationship 5
between the two, "will suggest that the futures were acquired as an in-
vestment and not as a hedge."
56
The transactions in Hoover fall within the protection prong dichot-
omy elucidated in Corn Products and Wool. Underscoring this conclu-
sion, the tax court admitted that the taxpayer in Hoover "did not enter
into [the future transactions] ...with the intent to speculate in the
pejorative sense."'57 More importantly, according to the court, "a lack
of speculation" in the transaction, by itself, was not enough to trigger
ordinary tax treatment. 8
The reasoning in Hoover is inconsistent with the logic in Wool in
still another way. In Hoover, the court concluded that the futures were
not hedges since they did not protect Hoover's balanced market posi-
tion in its currency holdings but only protected against a "theorized
loss in stock value."5 9 Simply stated, the taxpayer's currency futures
were not protecting holdings in foreign currency. In Wool, however,
the tax court expressly rejected this approach when it dismissed the
Commissioner's argument that the taxpayer deserved capital loss treat-
ment since he purchased currency futures, and not wool futures, to pro-
tect his wool investments.6" The court, in Wool, concluded that the
taxpayer was entitled to examine different methods of shielding itself
"never intentionally 'hedged' an amount in excess of its interest in the net value of the foreign
subsidiary." 72 T.C. at 225.
55 See Kurtin v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 958 (1956). Ordering ordinary tax treatment, the court in
Kurtin held that the taxpayer's butter futures were appropriate hedges for petitioner's cheese busi-
ness since the price of butter and cheese "normally" fluctuated in the same fashion. Id at 962.
56 34 T.C. at 331.
57 72 T.C. at 226-27.
58 72 T.C. at 240. W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), is another recent
tax court decision at variance to Hoover. In Windle, the taxpayer-wool processor, in order to
create a captive customer and to make a profitable investment, developed Nor West, a corporation
that operated a woolen textile mill. Subsequently, the taxpayer suffered losses on Nor West stock
transactions. The tax court held that while the taxpayer had a protective purpose in purchasing
the stock, it also had a speculative motive, and hence, the losses were capital. Thus Windle found
that a substantial investment motive precluded the applicability of Corn Products. Although spec-
ulative motive was the dispositive issue in Windle, the Hoover court ignored Hoover's complete
lack of speculative intent. This conflicts with the general principle that "Corn Products treatment
will be accorded assets acquired and retained without substantial investment intent." See Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 354. Finally, although the author of Comment, Section 741 and Corn Prod-
ucts: A Logical Extension?, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 90 (1978), noted that in 1978 the tax court "strictly
adhered" to the Windle court analysis, Id at 117, the Hoover court retreated substantially from
the Windle court reasoning.
59 72 T.C. at 238.
60 34 T.C. at 332.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:540(1980)
"from potentially adverse effects of devaluation and simply chose the
one that seemed best suited to its needs."6 Hence, the tax court's anal-
ysis in Wool is in sharp contrast to its narrow interpretation of hedging
in Hoover.
Since the transactions in Hoover are similar to the protective fu-
tures in Woo, Hoover may also be distinguished from cases where
speculative intent preempted application of ordinary tax treatment. In
Muldrow v. Commissioner,62 the tax court ruled that the taxpayer's
losses in cotton futures were capital because in the taxable year, Mul-
drow neither owned, held an inventory in, nor produced cotton.63 The
court reasoned that a speculative transaction seeks a favorable fluctua-
tion in price to realize profit on the future itself;' whereas, a hedge is a
form of insurance against adverse fluctuations in the price of a com-
modity that has already become fixed or will become fixed in the nor-
mal course of business, and "the sale, liquidation, or use of the
commodity is to occur . . . in the future. 65
The tax court made a similar ruling in Battelle v. Commissioner.66
In Battelle, the court held that the taxpayer's wheat future losses were
capital because they exceeded Battelle's actual or prudently anticipated
holdings in wheat.67 The court, however, concluded that Battelle's cot-
ton futures were hedges since the taxpayer "did not short himself in a
greater amount than he might reasonably have anticipated harvest-
ing."68 Unlike the taxpayers in Muldrow and Battelle who made future
transactions without actuals, the taxpayer in Hoover carefully calcu-
lated its exposure to foreign exchange risk, and, only after cautious pre-
61 Id at 333.
62 38 T.C. 907 (1962).
63 Id at 914.
64 Recently, in Oringderffv. Commissioner, 79,093 T.C.M., (P-H) (1979), the tax court applied
capital treatment to futures losses where the taxpayer sought a profit on the futures transactions
themselves. The taxpayer, a cattle farmer, did not employ cattle futures to protect his business
inventory in cattle from harmful market fluctuations. Instead of holding cattle futures until it was
time for future delivery, and thus locking in his profit at a set market price, Oringderff closed out
the futures months before the delivery date whenever he anticipated lucrative trends in the futures
market. The court concluded that the taxpayer's movement in and out of the market destroyed
the futures' protective features, placed the taxpayer at the mercy of the market, and proved that
the transactions were speculative. Id at 416-17. In contrast to Orin&derff, Hoover consistently
held its position in the market. Hoover never closed out its currency futures earlier than a week
before delivery was due under each contract. By retaining its position in the futures market until
moments before delivery, Hoover preserved the protective element of the futures transactions and
shielded itself from adverse market fluctuations.
65 38 T.C. at 913.
66 47 B.T.A. 117 (1942).
67 Id at 127.
68 Id
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diction, entered the futures market to protect against such risk.69 The
transactions in Hoover are analogous to those of a farmer who care-
fully predicts the amount of his harvest and then purchases futures to
protect against adverse market fluctuations.
International Flavors- The Integral Part of Business Doctrine
Ironically, the tax court itself, in International Flavors & Fra-
grances Inc. v. Commissioner,7" made the most potent argument for ap-
plying Corn Products to a factual setting like that in Hoover. The facts
are strikingly similar to those in Hoover:71 the corporate taxpayer with
subsidiaries abroad was concerned about the devaluation of the pound
and entered into a currency futures contract to "offset a possible write-
down of the net current assets of" their British subsidiary when prepar-
ing its annual consolidated financial statements.72
Although the goverment argued, in International Flavors, that
Corn Products did not apply because the taxpayer was protecting in-
vestment property,73 the tax court rejected this analysis and held that
the transaction was not an investment. Rather, the futures contract was
integral to the business as a transaction that offset corporate losses, and
thus, the resultant gain merited ordinary tax treatment under the Corn
Products rationale.74 The court reasoned that "[plurchases and sales of
foreign currency ...are part and parcel of a multinational busi-
69 Generally, the courts have applied capital tax treatment to transactions where there is a
substantial disparity between futures and actuals. In Meade v. Commissioner, 73,046 T.C.M. (P-
H) (1973), the taxpayer, a cattle farmer, engaged in futures transactions without regard to his
actuals. The court held that losses from such contracts deserved capital treatment because a "large
discrepancy between futures and actuals. . .[is] cogent evidence that the futures were acquired as
an investment and not a hedge." Id. at 73,213. Refusing to apply Corn Products, the court
concluded that the transactions were merely a form of speculation that provided no protective
business function, and accordingly, were not integrally related to Meade's business. In stark con-
trast to the random futures trading in Meade, the transactions in Hoover corresponded to Hoo-
ver's careful estimate of its exposed foreign exchange risk.
The tax court employed a similar analysis in Carpenter v. Commissioner, 66,188 T.C.M. (P-
H) (1966). In Carpenter, the court held that losses from the taxpayer's futures transactions were
capital for two reasons. First, Carpenter, a soybean and corn farmer, had futures in rye and
wheat-grains he did not produce. Second, taxpayer's soybean transactions far exceeded his actu-
als. Hence, unlike the transactions in Hoover, the futures contracts in Carpenter did not corre-
spond to Carpenter's actuals.
70 62 T.C. 232 (1974).
71 Taxpayers in both International Flavors and Hoover entered the futures market in response
to the November 18, 1967 devaluation of the British pound. 62 T.C. at 237, 72 T.C. at 215.
72 62 T.C. at 238.
73 72 T.C. at 235.
74 62 T.C. at 239-40.
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ness."'75 Furthermore, the court noted that the taxpayer conducted its
foreign business through a branch of the parent corporation rather than
a British subsidiary, "applicability of the Corn Products doctrine to
such transaction" could hardly be questioned; therefore, conducting
business through subsidiaries rather than branches did not "warrant
applicability of a different rule."7 6
Aware of the conflict between its reasoning and that in Interna-
tional Flavors, the court in Hoover simply discarded the latter reason-
ing when it wrote, "[t]o the extent that this view is inconsistent with our
original holding in International Flavors . . . we will no longer follow
that position."" In refusing to apply the Corn Products doctrine, the
tax court argued that seemingly capital property transactions deserve
ordinary treatment only when the transactions are an integral part of
the taxpayer's business operation; the fact that Hoover engaged in nu-
merous futures transactions does not make it an integral part of the
business.78
The Hoover court's reasoning also conflicts with the dissent's anal-
ysis in International Flavors. In her dissent, Judge Hall stated that
"Corn Products teaches that capital gain treatment is reserved for
'transactions in property which are not the normal source of business
income.' -79 The judge stated that Corn Products did not apply to In-
ternational Flavors because the transaction in the latter was not the
normal source of income since there was "no indication that the trans-
action was recurring."80 Moreover, she contended that the currency
hedge in International Flavors could not be part and parcel of a mul-
tinational business since there was no evidence that the transaction was
routine or customary for the taxpayer.8' The facts in International
Flavors diverge from those in Hoover in only one significant way. Al-
though there was merely a single transaction in International Flavors,
there were several transactions in Hoover. Hence, the Hoover interpre-
tation does not only directly conflict with the majority opinion in Inter-
national Flavors, but also is sharply inconsistent with the dissent.
75 Id at 239.
76 Id
77 72 T.C. at 237.
78 Id
79 62 T.C. at 244 (quoting Corn Products, 350 U.S. at 52).
80 62 T.C. at 244.
81 Id at 239.
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THE IMPACT OF HOOVER
In 1979, foreign currency futures made up 3%82 of the total volume
of futures activity.83 According to the Futures Industry Association,
these currency futures accounted for 2,222,978 of the 75,966,471 total
volume of commodity contracts traded.8 4 Moreover, since 1977, the to-
tal volume of foreign currency futures has not only proliferated, but
this volume has constituted a greater portion of the total volume of
commodities traded.
With the continuing acceleration of foreign currency futures activ-
ity, Hoover might have a profound impact upon both the international
currency market and the total commodity volume. By abandoning
Corn Products and its progeny, Hoover shattered the stability of slowly
evolving case law and became precedent for dangerous judicial discre-
tion. Free either to ignore or employ Supreme Court precedent, future
tax courts might develop result-oriented opinions that lead the taxpayer
down a one way street of capital losses and ordinary gains. United
States corporations that, like Hoover and International Flavors & Fra-
grances, employ international currency futures as protective mecha-
nisms against adverse market fluctuations might be deterred from
engaging in such activity when there is the added risk of both capital
loss and ordinary gain treatment. Without the protection of a stable
82 FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Assoc. BULL. No. 6062 (1979).
83 Instead of citing the estimated dollar value of foreign currency futures, this note considers
only volume estimates since the latter provide a more precise measurement of the relative impor-
tance of a given commodity in the futures market. Charles E. Robinson, Vice President of Futures
Industry Association, articulated this more fully in a letter to the author:
[Tihe estimated value of commodity futures contracts is no longer computed by the Futures
Industry Association. That figure is not and never has been a good measure of industry
activity. Further, such data cannot be used to compare the relative importance of trading in
different commodities.
A good illustration is obvious from examining the kind of data you would realize if you
used the estimated value figures for 1979. For T-bills traded on the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change, that figure would approach $2 trillion. As you probably are aware, the gross national
product last year only slightly exceeded the $2 trillion figure. Similarly, if we compare trad-
ing in soybean futures on the Chicago Board of Trade with trading in T-bill figures on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange we would find that soybean trading amounted to approxi-
mately $350 billion, approximately one-sixth of the value of T-bill futures. Obviously, the 9-
plus million contracts of soybean futures traded were much more important to the futures
community and to the nation's economy than the 1.9 million T-bill contracts traded.
Letter from Charles E. Robinson to Raymond Slomski (April 8, 1980).
84 FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Assoc. BULL. No. 6062 (1979).
85 For example, in 1977, the estimated volume of foreign currency futures traded was 586,428
which constituted 1.4% of the total volume of commodities traded. COMMODITY FUTURES TRAD-
ING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 1978 14 (1978). In 1978, the estimated foreign currency vol-
ume of 1,560,749 equaled 2.7% of the entire volume. FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Assoc.
BULL. No. 6062 (1979).
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body of tax law, these corporations might abandon the foreign currency
futures market.
CONCLUSION
The tax court, in Hoover Company v. CommissionerM6 ordered cap-
ital tax treatment for any future transaction which was outside the
court's narrowly defined concept-the "bona fide" hedge. Such analy-
sis retreats from Corn Products and recent tax opinions which employ
the "integral part of business" doctrine. Unlike Hoover, these cases
distinguished hedging transactions from speculative futures contracts
simply by analyzing the intent of the taxpayer. If the taxpayer em-
ployed the transactions as insurance mechanisms which shielded some
interest of the taxpayer from damaging price fluctuations, the courts
unanimously applied ordinary tax treatment. On the other hand, if the
transactions were speculative ventures which were expected to produce
profit themselves-not to counter a market price flux-the courts or-
dered capital tax treatment.
An explanation for Hoover's departure from the Corn Products
doctrine is that this line of cases arguably failed to articulate a rule
providing clear guidance to subsequent judiciaries. Even if the Hoover
court's decision is a reaction to the amorphous law surrounding Corn
Products, Hoover's rule fails to remove the ambiguity. By focusing its
opinion on the form of the transaction, Hoover ignored the Congres-
sional purpose behind the "capital asset" definition that was articulated
in Corn Products-namely, that capital tax rates were exclusively re-
served for speculative transactions. The Hoover analysis will provide
certainty only if one assumes that a taxpayer who uses a hedge as a
protective mechanism will always have a "bona fide" hedge. But the
Hoover rule fails since a taxpayer may hedge for insurance or protec-
tive purposes, and yet, such hedge might be accorded capital tax treat-
ment by the courts if it lies outside the narrow "bona fide" hedge
definition.
Raymond J Slomski Jr.
86 72 T.C. 206 (1979).
